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Preface
 
This end-of-project report for the Korean Agricultural Planning Project
 
takes a somewhat different perspective than most such reports. We do not
 
detail, in any comprehensive way, the achievements and successes or the
 
project. These,in the final analysis, can only be inferred from what
 
happens to the quality and process of Korean agricultural sector planning and
 
policy analysis over the next several years. Even the list of published
 
output from the project is incomplete inthat much of the written output,
 
the verbal communication in discussions, conversations, and workshops, and
 
the interaction among government officials and between them and nongovern­
ment personnel who came together because of our presence resulted inchanges
 
inperspective, policy formulation, organizational structure and process
 
(both formal and informal) that cannot (and, inmany instances should not)
 
be accounted in a report such as this.
 
Thus, the thrust of this report is to critically analyze the process of
 
the project and to suggest lessons learned in carrying out this project
 
that may be useful for others in designing similar future projects elsewhere.
 
We recognize that this analysis carries our own particular perspective and
 
that the view from USAID/K or from the Korean Ministry of Agriculture and
 
Fisheries may be different. Our analysis is critical but it is intended to
 
be constructive and a learning device rather than destructive and divisive.
 
We would welcome supplements to this report from USAID/K and/or MAF inthe
 
same spirit.
 
George E. Rossmiller
 
Director
 
Korean Agricultural Planning Project
 
Background and Objectives
 
During the first two Korean Five-Year Economic Development Plans (1962­
1971), emphasis was directed toward building social infrastructure and expan­
sion of the industrial and export sectors of the Korean economy. Agricul­
tural sector development was allowed to lag behind the rest of the economy
 
during that period. With the initiation of the Third Five-Year Economic
 
Development Plan in 1972, development emphasis shifted to include the ag­
ricultural sector. Thus, the Ministry'of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF)
 
realized an increased responsibility in planning, policy formulation, program
 
development and project design and execution dirccted toward achieving the
 
plan goals for agricultural sector development.
 
Korean government attention to the agricultural sector and its develop­
ment can be traced to a variety of reasons. First, just under fifty percent
 
of the population resided ir the agricultural sector in 1972 and the sector
 
contributed just under thirty percent of Gross National Product (GNP).
 
Second, farm household incomes were low relative to nonfarm household incomes
 
and the gap was widening because of the relative emphasis of the first two
 
five-year plans. Third, rural to urban migration was straining the limits
 
of the absorbative capacity of the industrial sector for labor. Fourth,
 
agricultural productivity increases were not keeping pace with the increased
 
demand for agricultural commodities, thus, increasing amounts of scarce
 
foreign exchange were required for agricultural imports. Shortages of grains
 
in the world markets during 1972-1974 and resultant world price increases
 
compounded the problem.
 
The various functions related to planning and development activities for
 
the agricultural sector were located in numerous agencies and offices within
 
and outside of MAF. The relatively low capacity of personnel within many of
 
these scattered agencies for using modern analytical techniques and an organi­
zational structure which precluded adequate coordination of the various func­
tions made effective planning and development activities extremely difficult.
 
Recommendations by the Korean Agricultural Sector Study (KASS) team for an
 
agricultural sector development strategy included implementation of "a policy
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of improving agricultural policy formulation procedures, programs, project
 
I
design and public administration and execution."' These recommendations
 
also called for the reorganization of MAF along functional lines to facili­
tate horizontal as well as vertical coordination and organization For more
 
effective and coordinated statistical and agricultural economics work.
 
Hathaway arid Rossmiller, in their KASS paper, provided the basis for the
 
broad recommendations. 2 They went into somewhat greater detail in their
 
recommendations concerning various aspects of the statistics collection and
 
include the functions
processing system and the economic analysis system to 

of policy, program and project analysis, agricultural outlook and long-run
 
structural economic research.
 
By 1972, MAF appeared to be prepared to proceed with more precisely de­
fining operational activities for implementation of many of the KASS recom­
mendations. They indicated a readiness to receive and accommodate technical
 
of economic analysis -- policy analysis,
assistance in three major areas 

-- and in the re­agricultural outlook, and program and project evaluation 

lated area of agricultural statistics.
 
On this basis, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and USAID/Korea
 
developed a three-year technical assistance project. MAF requested that
 
Michigan State University (MSU) be the project contractor since they were
 
the Korean Agricultural Sector
satisfied with the work being done by MSU on 

Study and there was mutual recognition of the need for close coordination
 
between the Korean Agricultural Sector Study and the Korean Agricultural
 
Planning Project.
 
1Rossmiller, G. E., et al., Korean Agricultural Sector Analysis and Recommended
 
Strategies, 1971-1985. Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Seoul, Korea;
 
and Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, East
 
Lansing, 1972. (Also translated into Korean.)
 
2Hathaway, Dale E. and Rossmiller, George E., "Organization of the Ministry
 
of Agriculture and Forestry," Republic of Korea, Michigan State University,
 
June 1972.
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The general objective of the Korean Agricultural Planning Project was
 
to increase the capacity of the Ministry of A9 iculture and Fisheries and
 
through them the government of the Republic of Korea for sound planning,
 
agricultural policy formulation, program development and project design and
 
execution toward more rapid and effective development of the agricultural
 
sector. Project working objectives included 1) to understand the organiza­
tional structure and the operational processes used by MAF in planning and
 
developmental activities and to identify the constraints in these systems
 
leading to ineffective, inefficient and operationally unsound outcomes;
 
2) to advise on organizational and functional means to overcome the con­
straints identified in 1) above; and 3) to conduct substantive work on
 
current issues within the scope of the project to relieve current problems
 
and to provide on-the-job training in the use of modern analytical tech­
niques and processes for Korean personnel of the Ministry of Agriculture
 
and Fisheries.
 
Organization of the Project
 
The Korean Agricultural Planning Project was carried out under a contrac­
tual arrangement between the Korean Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
 
and Michigan State University utilizing funding from a USAID/K grant to MAF.
 
The original contract specified that the technical assistance from MSU to
 
MAF would include three long-term positions as follows: 1) a policy analyst
 
(agricultural economist) working with the Planning Coordinator's Office in
 
MAF, 2) an agricultural outlook analyst (agricultural economist) working
 
with the Agricultural Development Bureau, MAF, and in close cooperation with
 
the Statistics Bureau, MAF, and the National Agricultural Economics Research
 
Institute, and 3) a program and project evaluation analyst (agricultural
 
economist) working initially with the Agricultural Development Corporation
 
(ADC), the MAF operational agency responsible for land and water develop­
ment, but also available to work with other MAF agencies as appropriate.
 
The planninq horizon for the project was to be a three-year period with
 
a review at the end of each year to assess progress and to determine specific
 
emphases and work plans for the following year. In addition to the long-term
 
personnel, provision was included for bringing in short-term project per­
sonnel and consultants as determined appropriate by MAF, MSU and USAID/K.
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Finally, the need for coordination among KAPP project personnel, between
 
KAPP and KASS personnel and between KAPP personnel and all concerned agen­
cies of MAF was recognized. Toward this end, the KAPP policy analyst was
 
designated as KAPP Chief of Party and as substantive program liaison between
 
KAPP and KASS.
 
The initial activity under the KAPP contract was a review and analysis
 
of the Korean agricultural statistics and data acquisition system carried
 
out in summer 1974. This activity led to a report with a series of recommenda­
tions for improvement of the system.3 One of the major recommendations was
 
that an agricultural statistics consultant be assigned under the Korean
 
Agricultural Planning Project for a period of one year to work with the
 
Statistics Bureau, MAF and other agencies identified as part of the Korean
 
agricultural data system to recommend and help implement changes in the
 
data system with respect to collection, processing, storage and retrieval
 
of agricultural data to make the data more relevant, timely, accurate and
 
consistent for use in planning, policy, program, and project activities
 
dealing with further development of the agricultural sector and the economy
 
as a whole. This recommendation was acted upon by amendment to the original
 
contract. Thus, the KAPP technical assistance consisted of help in the four
 
areas of policy analysis, agricultural outlook, program and project evaluation,
 
and agricultural statistics.
 
This final project report complements materials presented in previous
 
semi-annual and annual reports of progress under the Project. Repetition
 
of materials presented in previous project reports is minimal. Rather, the
 
emphasis is reflective and diagnostic in nature with a view toward iden­
tifying general measures and specific steps for use should a similar endeavor
 
be undertaken in Korea or elsewhere.
 
Description, Analysis and Evaluation of Activities
 
From its inception, the KAPP contract envisioned a three-way cooperative
 
effort for the purpose of improving the operational process through which
 
3Culver, David W., Wright, Karl T., and Rossmiller, George E., "The Korean
 
Agricultural Statistics and Data System: Review and Recommendations."
 
Korean Agricultural Planning Project, Seoul, Korea, August 1974.
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planning, policy formulation, program development and project design and
 
execution take place with respect to the agricultural sector within the
 
Korean government. First, Michigan State University was to supply specialists
 
in the four areas of concentration with the recognition that their inputs
 
were complementary and thereby required cooperative efforts and interaction
 
through a comprehensive work plan. Second, both substantive and logistical
 
inputs were expected of the Korean government, specifically the Ministry of
 
Agriculture and Fisheries, and most importantly, a readiness and willingness
 
to interact freely for the purpose of promoting objectives of the contract.
 
Third, the need for a free flow of information and close interaction was
 
obvious between MAF on the one hand and the National Agricultural Economics
 
Research Institute on the other, where the KASS team was developing, insti-

Lutionalizing and using the agricultural sector simulation model.
 
The contractual document itself contained a well-conceived "operational
 
plan." It recognized the need for the three-way cooperative linkages
 
indicated above and specified that each KAPP specialist, upon his arrival,
 
would, within sixty days, prepare a wo-k plan in close consultation with
 
other KAPP personnel, MAF and the KASS team in NAERI. If there was a weak­
ness in the operational plan, it was in not specifying the procedures and
 
the types of input necessary from MAF in prescribing the operational objec­
tives and the project plan of work as a whole as opposed to that for the
 
individual team members. In any event, the practice of preparing individual
 
work plans within the first sixty days varied among members of the team. In
 
addition, an obstacle to developing a team-wide working plan and a full
 
cooperative interaction among team members was the phased arrival of KAPP
 
personnel.
 
An inherent assumption of the KAPP contract was that the Ministry of
 
Agriculture and Fisheries had come to recognize some of their organizational
 
problems and were prepared to move forward positively and forthrightly
 
toward their solution. As the project unfolded it became evident that this
 
assumption vastly overstated the evolving position within the Ministry. The
 
slowness with which the Ministry approached these problems seriously limited
 
the attainment of overall project objectives.
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Location and Operational Methods of Individual Team Members
 
Policy Analyst
 
In the conceptualization of the operational plan in the contract, input
 
by the policy analyst was crucial to the success of the entire effort. This
 
was due to the responsibility placed upon the project analyst to identify,
 
define and describe the institutional structure within which the other KAPP
 
team members functioned and to recommend organizational and institutional
 
changes which would facilitate removal of constraints thus identified. The
 
policy analyst who had been identified as the project team leader was the
 
first to take up residence in Korea under the project, arriving in June 1974.
 
While the policy analyst was intended to work with counterparts from the
 
Planning Bureau in MAF, he was in effect, appointed as policy advisor without
 
portfolio or official attachment and functioned loosely through the Inter­
national Cooperation Office, MAF. Informal contacts were built with various
 
Ministry personnel and advice was on an ad hoc basis. This policy analyst
 
was charged by MAF through the International Cooperation Office to provide
 
helpful suggestions as they occurred to him and/or as requested by MAF. He
 
was provided with a working counterpart for the first six or eight months
 
of his tour which helped significantly in preparing an analysis of the Korean
 
fertilizer industry and in making recommendations for improving the agricul­
tural marketing system. Because of uncertainties and rigidities within MAF
 
concerning organizational structure changes, the first policy analyst was
 
unable to carry out one major item in the terms of reference, namely, to
 
prepare a report and recommendations on organizational and administrative
 
constraints and recommended remedies.
 
The second policy analyst arrived in November 1976 approximately one
 
year after the departure of the first. During the interim period between
 
the departure of the first policy analyst and the arrival of the second, the
 
agricultural outlook analyst filled that position as well as his own. The
 
arrival of the second policy analyst was planned to coincide with an interim
 
evaluation of the project by MSU, USAID/K and MAF. During this evaluation,
 
it was explicitly agreed between MSU and MAF that the policy analyst would
 
prepare a work plan for the balance of his tour by 1 January 1977.
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This plan first proposed a collaborative effort to diagnose the nature
 
and extent of organizational and administrative problems and to prescribe
 
solutions to them. Second, it proposed an approach for a comprehensive
 
reassessment of total agricultural policy with the development of a National
 
Food and Nutrition Policy as the nucleus for the review and reassessment.
 
Once this line of work was established or at least well started, attention
 
would be given to other areas including price and production policy, agri­
cultural marketing policy, agricultural research policy and education policy
 
for rural people. An essential feature of this plan was that this collab­
orative effort would involve task forces of Koreans representing appropriate
 
agencies and perspectives with the KAPP policy analyst filling a motivating
 
and organizational role. It was felt that only in this way would lasting
 
benefits be derived. An approach would be implemented, A process begun,
 
whereby Koreans would address their own problems so that the proposed solu­
tions would be more relevant with more chance of acceptance than if they
 
came out of a series of one-shot, short shelf life reports by a foreign
 
advisor. Thus, the focus was as much on the process and building the capa­
city to execute the process as on the solutions themselves.
 
The work statement was well received by the MAF contract officer for the
 
project and he immediately requested a comparable statement covering the
 
remaining time for the other two technicians still with the project -- the
 
agricultural outlook analyst and the program and project evaluation analyst.
 
While all three work statements were accepted and approved by MAF and cer­
tain counterpart and logistic inputs were promised, in fact, only limited
 
cooperation was forthcoming. As a result, only limited progress was made
 
in the policy analysis dimension of the project. Progress fell considerably
 
short of the potential which could have been so easily attained.
 
Agricultural Outlook Analyst
 
The agricultural outlook analyst arrived in June 1975 for a two-year
 
period. His task was made especially difficult because,even though MAF
 
indicated a clear intention during the drafting of the KAPP contract, there
 
was, in fact, not a commitment by MAF to establish an agricultural outlook
 
program. The agricultural outlook analyst was officed with the policy analyst
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in the Ministry of Agriculture but without formal attachment to any specific
 
unit within MAF charged with responsibility for his area of work. Prior to
 
initiation of the project, limited situation and outlook activities were
 
conducted by the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF),a semi­
autonomous agency of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. At times
 
there appeared to be an interest in locating this responsibility within MAF
 
per se. MAF, in 1976, however, took a decision to locate this service
 
within the National Agricultural Economics Research Institute (NAERI). The
 
Director of NAERI was extremely reluctant to take on this responsibility,
 
primarily because NAERI was already understaffed and did not have qualified
 
outlook specialists. Over a period of several months the Director attempted
 
to have the function reassigned back to MAF. His attempts failed but sup­
port for situation and outlook development within NAERI remained a very low
 
priority item. 
Indications of the low priority placed by MAF on agricultural outlook 
came shortly after the KAPP contract was negotiated. MSU and MAF agreed to 
delay the arrival of the agricultural outlook analyst for one year in order 
that MAF could work through the decision on where within the MAF structure 
outlook would be assigned. Unfortunately, this decision was never made 
satisfactorily and a major portion of the efforts of the agricultural out­
look analyst were diverted to work in the policy analyst's position and 
out­area of responsibility. Just prior to his departure, the agricultural 

look analyst had been working with two designated individuals at NAERI to
 
produce some published outlook materials. Even though the materials were
 
assembled and virtually at publication stage at the time of his departure,
 
the materials were never published and the individuals concerned at NAERI
 
were shifted to other assignments.
 
Program and Project Evaluation Analyst
 
This position was filled by two different individuals during the course
 
of the project but without a break between them as occurred for the policy
 
analyst position. In fact, the second individual was working in Korea under
 
an AID 211d grant project related to KAPP for approximately one year before
 
assuming the program and project analyst position.
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The program and project analyst undoubtedly had the most favorable
 
environment for meaningful contributions toward KAPP project objectives.
 
This position was located in the Agricultural Development Corporation,
 
a semiautonomous agency of MAF, responsible for all agricultural
 
land and water development activities in Korea. By virtue of being located
 
with ADC, the program and project analyst's contributions were limited
 
primarily to that agency with little impact on MAF itself. A newly created
 
Agricultural Economics Division in*ADC was just being staffed when the first
 
program and project analyst arrived. He was attached to.the project analysis
 
unit of this division. A separate budget was provided for both his logistical
 
and analytical support.
 
ADC was under pressure to apply technically adequate methodologies
 
in project analysis to satisfy both international lender agencies and the
 
Economic Planning Board, ROK. Thus, while the institutional structure had
 
inadequacies and rigidities, the personnel were receptive to suggestions
 
by the program and project analysts during the course of their respective
 
tours. The capabilities of Korean personnel in the project analysis
 
unit and, more broadly, in the Agricultural Economics Division, were sub­
stantially enhanced during this period.
 
Toward the end of his tour, the second program and project analyst held
 
two one-week workshops on methodology for project evaluation and analysis
 
and, in addition, compiled a set of "readings" for reference purposes by
 
staff members in the project analysis unit, Agricultural Economics Division,
 
ADC. While good progress was made and the major objectives of the contract
 
were met by the program and project analysts at ADC, they had little oppor­
tunity for impact on MAF, the parent organization. This was partly due to
 
the semiautonomous nature of ADC and in part because ADC was located some 40
 
kilometers from Seoul in Anyang. Discussions were held between MSU and MAF
 
several times during the course of the project about the advisability of the
 
program and project analyst spending part of his time in MAF. These discus­
sions were always resolved in favor of his spending full time at ADC, in part
 
because MAF found it more convenient for him to derive his total logistical
 
and analytical support from that organization.
 
10
 
Agricultural Statistics Analyst
 
The rationale for this position was developed after the initial contract
 
was drawn and the position was added by contract amendment. The position was
 
originally intended to be filled for one year but subsequent decisions extended
 
the period of work by the Agricultural Statistics Analyst from May 1976 through
 
January 1977.
 
Itwas initially determined that the Agricultural Statistics Analyst would
 
work within the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics , MAF. After several months
 
of close study of the issues involved, the analyst suggested that the major
 
problem facing the Agricultural Statistics Bureau was in editing, handling
 
and processing data after its initial collection in order that it be consis­
tent, timely, and relevant as input to the decision process. He therefore
 
proceeded to devise a technique for expediting this phase of the statistical
 
program with the concurrence of MAF. Throughout the period of his work with
 
KAPP, the Agricultural Statistician did not receive adequate logistical support
 
nor counterpart activity from MAF. Consequently, he found it more appropriate
 
to pursue the effort with colleagues in the Statistics Bureau of the Economic
 
Planninq Board and at the Korean Institute for Science and Technology.
 
The operating personnel within the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, MAF,
 
became progressively less interested in the procedures being developed by the
 
Agricultural Statistician although further development of that software package
 
and adoption was rather strongly favored by the Director General for Planning
 
and Management, MAF, under whose jurisdiction tne bureau of Agricultural
 
Statistics falls. A part of the disinterest may have been attributable to a
 
feeling among operating personnel in BAS that automation of the data-handling
 
processes and handling of the actual data itself in ways somewhat different
 
from what they were accustomed to would put their jobs and their status in
 
jeopardy.
 
In part, due to lack of MAF support, the Agricultural Statistics Analyst
 
was unable to coniplete his software package within the time frame budgeted for
 
his activity in the contract. He remained in Korea for approximately an
 
additional year during which he finished the software package with minimal
 
logistical and programming support from KIST. By this time, the MAF position
 
had hardened against adoption of his package and, thus, he was unable to even
 
receive a fair hearing of his adoption proposal. At the time MSU withdrew
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from Korea under the KAPP contract, the Agricultural Statistician was still
 
in residence, negotiating with the Bureau of Statistics, EPB, for possible
 
adoption of the package. The set of circumstances precluding the adoption
 
of this software package by the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, MAF, was
 
indeed unfortunate. If it had been incorporated into the agricultural statis­
tics processing system,much more timely, consistent, and accurate data could
 
have been produced.
 
This unfortunate experience in retrospect points out the need for more
 
detailed, interactive development of the technical assistance scope of work.
 
KAPP felt the need for this specific software package; obviously BAS did not.
 
Short-Term Consultant Input
 
In addition to the long-term personnel filling the KAPP positions, several
 
short-term consultancies took place, particularly in the areas of agricultural
 
statistics and policy analysis.
 
As indicated earlier during the June-August 1974 period, three short-term
 
consultants composed a task force to evaluate the agricultural statistics and
 
data acquisition system in Korea. They developed a set of recommendations
 
that could, in large part, be immediately used by the Republic of Korea, and,
 
secondly, recommended the expansion of the KAPP to include an agricultural
 
statistician. This three-man team was given access to all agencies concerned
 
with statistics, and they operated from within the International Cooperation
 
Office under the jurisdiction of the Director-General for Planning and Manage­
ment.
 
Short-term consultancies on policy analysis included the return of the
 
first policy analyst for one month during June and July 1977 and several visits
 
by the campus-based project director, particularly during summer 1974 and summer
 
1977. As during his long-term tour, the first policy analyst, during his one­
month consultancy, was loosely attached to MAF with close liaison with the Chief
 
of Overall Planning. Jointly they addressed price policy questions with regard
 
to meat, rice and miscellaneous crops and worked on income transfer policy
 
alternatives to the high rice price. The project director focused major atten­
tion in summer 1974 on establishment of an ad hoc grains price policy task force
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that remained in effect throughout the period of the KAPP contract for providing
 
information inestablishing rice and barley purchase and release prices to
 
satisfy the objectives of the government's grain management program. In summer
 
1977, the project director participated inan agricultural development policy
 
conference sponsored jointly by MAF and KAPP. T 4s conference was viewed as
 
successFul enough by MAF that they plan to make it an annual event. Inaddi­
tion, the project director worked with the chief of the Agricultural Economics
 
Division, Marketing Bureau, MAF, and .the KASS team in projecting necessary in­
creases incapacities in the marketing system for agricultural commodities over
 
the next 15 years and investment requirements for effecting those changes.
 
Constraints to Full Project Implementation
 
As indicated earlier, the explicit assumption made as the KAPP contract
 
was being negotiated was that the Ministry of Agriculture recognized some of
 
their organizational and management problems and were ready and willing to
 
cope with them. Between the stage of contract negotiation and contract imple­
mentation,MAF interest in pursuing wholeheartedly the contract objectives
 
declined substantially. During contract negotiation the need, apparent to all
 
parties involved -- MAF, MSU, USAID/K -- was to focus on the objectives specifi­
ed in the contract if the Ministry was to provide the developmental leadership
 
the society had every reason to expect. Unfortunately, p~rformance did not
 
fulfill the promise for a variety of reasons, the most important of which are
 
discussed below.
 
Fragmented Organizational Structure
 
The fragmented organizational structure of MAF results in there being
 
no single unit of the Ministry with which other units of government or outside
 
entities may deal on matters of mutual concern, apart from the Minister him­
self. The same difficulty prevails for technical assistance (particularly
 
those in a policy advisory role). To conduct meaningful policy analytical
 
work, it is necessary to interact with numerous individuals dealing with
 
various aspects of the problem or issue or with the Minister or Vice Minister.
 
It is simply not feasible for an outsider, even though a resident advisor,
 
to initiate meetings of personnel from different bureaus of the Ministry
 
each time a new question arises. Attempts to interact directly with the
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Minister and/or Vice Minister, even on only the major issues, appear to be
 
threatening and are therefore thwarted by lower level Ministry personnel.
 
Style of Administration
 
Particularly distinctive of the Korean administrative style is the
 
employment of subordinates for both staff and line purposes simultaneously.
 
Another important distinction is the apparent reluctance of middle level
 
staff to channel new ideas or adverse reactions up the chain of command.
 
This results in useful management data from existing projects and programs
 
either being suppressed or not flowing quickly enough to decision makers
 
who can take remedial action. It also means that changes in policies/programs
 
come about very slowly and only upon the initiative of the man in top authority,
 
in this case, the Minister. Since neither the Minister nor the Vice Minister
 
employ full-time advisory staffs, their offices become bottlenecks to exped­
itious administration due to the sheer numbers of decisions involved. Thus,
 
short-term decision time pressures crowd out long-term problem considerations.
 
A combination of the fragmented structure and the style of administra­
tion may partially explain the gap between the MAF commitment to contract
 
objectives by higher level officials and the commitment to implementation
 
by the lower level officials.
 
Counterpart Analysts
 
A significant number of Koreans were trained in the United States under
 
AID participant training support in connection with both KAPP and KASS.
 
Unfortunately, upon their return, none of these students were assigned to work
 
with members of the KAPP team. This deprived them of further on-the-job develop­
ment in association with knowledgeable foreign advisors and also severely limited
 
the effectiveness of the foreign advisors. Full involvement of counterparts
 
and at least partial adoption of the recommended organizational changes would
 
have permitted far more progress in institutionalizing processes and training
 
individuals to execute the needed analyses than was the case,
 
Other Staff Counterparts
 
Aside from an English-speaking secretary for the several team members,
 
six months of analytical counterpart input for the first policy analyst, and
 
counterparts assiqned by ADC, Korean substantive counterpart inputs to
 
KAPP were totally lacking. This was extremely detrimental to achieving project
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ojectives inall instances, but especially so in the case of the agricultural
 
policy analyst and the agricultural statistician.
 
MSU Recruiting Problems
 
With internal financial support for international activities at U.S.
 
land-grant universities extremely limited and no long-term funding for the
 
Agency for International Development to overstaff in anticipation of possible
 
foreign activities such as KAPP, it is usually necessary to recruit at least
 
in part from outside the contracting university to fill given contracts. In
 
this particular case, all long-term field staff were recruited from off-campus,
 
although four of the six professionals filling the long-term positions had
 
previously had associations with MSU. These constraints on recruitment in­
creased the problem of identifying experienced field project leadership,
 
obtaining the desired balance between academic and government service exper­
iences and synchronizing arrival times according to the needs of the project.
 
Fortunately,a number of other MSU staff were on-site as part of the KASS team
 
and they provided additional continuity, background and experience to the KAPP
 
activity.
 
USAID/K Project MoniLoring
 
The USAID/K project manager for KAPP was in frequent contact with the
 
leadership and other project personnel. Inretrospect, the project manager
 
might have intervened more with MAF, particularly during the early stages
 
of the project to assure that the terms of the contract were being fulfilled,
 
particularly with regard to logistic and counterpart support by MAF and in
 
promoting agreement between MAF and MSU on the scope of work for individual
 
team members. If a more satisfactory agreement were not possible under this
 
process, USAID/K might have been well advised to have proposed termination
 
of the project. USAID/K was involved inat least three formal evaluative ex­
ercises of the project and at those times was extremely helpful in plotting
 
project direction and in resolving some of the major issues confronting the
 
contractual parties.
 
Contract Administration by MAF
 
Several of the key MAF personnel originally involved in negotiating
 
the KAPP contract were transferred to other positions by the time implementation
 
commenced. Their replacements inMAF did not manifest the same enthusiasm
 
15
 
for the project that was present during the negotiation stages. As a result,
 
the task of administering the project from the MAF side reverted to the
 
International Cooperation Office, an entity identified in the contract as
 
providing only a supportive and logistic role to the other major units
 
involved. In most matters, the function of the International Cooperation
 
Office is to serve a liaison role. With respect to this particular project,
 
it appeared at numerous times that the ICO extended itself beyond the
 
official bounds and took on policy-making positions without the full know­
ledge or approval of senior Ministry personnel. Again, in retrospect,
 
senior personnel at MAF and MSU agree that this intervention by the Inter­
national Cooperation Office contributed substantially to a shortfall in
 
project performance.
 
Project Achievements
 
Despite the constraints, the major of which have been enumerated above,
 
there have been significant accomplishments under the project, many of which
 
may not manifest themselves for some time to come, given the style of admin­
istration in Korea. According to the spirit and letter of the contract
 
document, the contractor was charged with providing best efforts to recommend
 
changes in organizational structures and in administrative procedures and
 
to train people on the job to employ these new structures and procedures to
 
more effectively provide information to the decision process. By implication,
 
this could be interpreted as leading to a very minimum of publications from
 
the project. As events unfolded, more publications were issued than might
 
have been expected due to the operational style of MAF in relating to KAPP
 
professional personnel. The attitude of the Korean project managers appeared
 
somewhat ambivalent on the matter of publications. On the one hand, there
 
was the complaint that usually projects of this nature generate too many
 
publications, most of which are not read by Koreans due to the language diffi­
culty and that personal interactions would be far more appropriate. On the other
 
hand, as sensitive issues were identified over which useful interaction could
 
take place and from which the Ministry could have benefited, there was a
 
withdrawal to the suggestion that publications might be preferred. A list
 
of project publications is attached as Appendix B.
 
Details on project accomplishments have been supplied in previous project
 
reports. Some limited observations with respect to accomplishments by
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each position follow.
 
Policy Analyst
 
Many of the benefits in this area remain invisible in the sense that
 
they were interactions between various members of the team and individual Ministry
 
officers. In small as well as major ways, some of these discussions found
 
their way into Ministry policy positions. For example, in December 1976, the
 
overall planning officer of the Ministry asked the policy analyst for sugges­
tions for policy changes beginning in 1977. A suggestion by the policy analyst
 
was that research and development attention be broadened beyond rice in an­
ticipation of the growing demand for a greater variety of foods, the need for
 
more balanced nutrition than can be provided by a single commodity emphasis
 
and the likelihood that the demand for rice would stabilize or decline in the
 
near future. During the annual visitation by the President to MAF in January
 
1977, the Minister of Agriculture proclaimed that "Koreans should tailor their
 
dietary requirements more to their environment." Subsequently a broadening
 
of the planned research focus was apparent in budget documents.
 
In a paper presented at the first national Agricultural Policy Develop­
ment Seminar in June 1977, the second policy analyst presented a paper ad­
vising on steps to take in developing a national food and nutrition policy.
 
Contained in this statement was a brief table illustrating the effects of the
 
high rice price policy in accentuating the disparity of incomes among farm
 
households. It was subsequently learned that the Minister of Agriculture
 
was shocked at this outcome and immediately arranged with the Ministry of
 
Finance to obtain $2 million equivalent to inaugurate pilot programs to
 
begin correcting this situation. The short-term visit in the summer of 1977
 
by the first policy analyst was helpful in reinforcing the Ministry position
 
with respect to pricing of beef products and paving the way for acceptance
 
of Economic Planning Board proposals in this area. The emphasis of food and
 
nutrition policy development needs for Korea are strongly shared by nutri­
tionistsand other specialists outside of government. Sustained encourage­
ment from them to various government officials should, over time, lead to
 
the formulation of national policy on food and nutrition.
 
The emerging problems in Korean agriculture make it imperative that
 
broader approaches to solving problems be adopted, particularly in a manner
 
to link the livestock and grain components of agriculture. Realization
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of this necessity may, in fact, be the element required to bring about admin­
istrative reform as well as broader analytical approaches to issues faced by MAF
 
and Korean agriculture. When that time comes, the shortcomings identified in
 
the present organization and management areas by KAPP should be useful to
 
Korean analysts and public administratiors. In fact, since the departure of
 
MSU/KAPP from Korea, a new Minister of agriculture has decided to reorganize
 
NAERI effective the first day of April 1978 into the Korea Rural Economics Institute
 
outside the government civil service system. Part of the present NAERI staff
 
will transfer to this new institute and part will return to the Office of
 
Rural Development at Suwon to support the technical agricultural research program.
 
This was recommended by both KAPP and KASS on several occasions during the
 
course of the projects.
 
Program and Project Analyst
 
A major accomplishment inthis area was the progress made in gaining an
 
appreciation for acceptance of and skills in the use of economic analysis
 
as well a- engineering and agrinomic input into water and land development
 
projects. Both on the job training and special workshops and seminars con­
tributed to this accomplishment. In addition, the program and project
 
analysts were able to provide, over the sustained period of the contract,
 
valued advice on a variety of matters, particularly on policy directions
 
and evaluative procedures to the President of the Agricultural Development
 
Corporation. Unfortunately, due to the physical distances between ADC and
 
MAF proper, itwas not feasible to install the project analytical capability
 
within MAF itself. The simultaneous pursuit of self-sufficiency in grain
 
and an ambitious livestock development program will soon point out the need
 
for overall application of economic analysis of projects to Ministry opera­
tions. Presumably, at that time, the Agricultural Economics unit in ADC
 
will be if"a position to help MAF along these lines.
 
Agricultural Outlook Analyst
 
Several documents were prepared by the agricultural outlook analyst
 
pointing out the analytical and operational procedures necessary for in­
stalling an agricultural situation and outlook program in Korea. The nature
 
of agricultural development and the competition among economic sectors
 
will eventually make the case for such an activity. Again, while no such
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program was established and operational during the KAPP activity, a good deal
 
of discussion as to what such a program should include and where it should be
 
operationalized ensued from the presence of the agricultural outlook analyst.
 
When MAF is prepared to move forward in establishing such a service, the
 
documents prepared by the agricultural outlook analyst should be of value.
 
Agricultural Statistician
 
The software package developed by the agricultural statistics analyst
 
appears to offer major benefits to the organizations in many countries respon­
sible for large-scale statistical surveys. The process offers substantial
 
savings in both operating time and financial cost in processing field survey
 
data and in publishing that data for use by decision makers in an efficient and
 
timely fashion. The software package would be particularly well-suited in Korea
 
since several large-scale annual surveys are conducted. Although the Korean
 
government has been slow to develop an appreciation for the merits of this
 
package, if it is accepted at a later date, it could be one of the most valu­
able contributions from the KAPP activity. In addition, the software package
 
is adaptable to statistical surveys in other developing or developed countries.
 
Does the KAPP-Type Activity Bear Repeating Elsewhere?
 
One of the major considerations determining the need for KAPP was the
 
lack of coordination and interaction between the policy researchers (i.e. the
 
National Agricultural Economics Research Institute and its Korean Agricultural
 
Sector Study activity) and the decision makers and their problems in the
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. One of the major objectives of KAPP
 
was to bridge the gap between the model developers and analysts on the one
 
hand, and the decision makers and their problems on the other. When viewed as
 
part of the total MSU involvement in Korea, KAPP provided this bridging activity
 
with relatively good success. The Korean Agricultural Planning Project could
 
have better met its objectives had there been a broader base of support
 
and involvement and a clearer understanding of the purposes of the activity
 
both within and outside the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.
 
At the time this project was conceived, the technical assistance specified
 
in the contract was critically needed by the Ministry of Agriculture and
 
Fisheries. Perhaps the main lesson from the activity is that in any similar
 
19
 
project, a commitment from high government levels, both within and outside the
 
Agricultural Ministry, should be obtained so that performance by the host
 
government is not subject to so much variation simply due to periodic rota­
tion of personnel. In addition, a commitment by the host government to
 
institutionalize the activities and to carry out the functions performed
 
under the project after the technical assistance experts withdraw would be
 
desirable. This latter commitment would place a heavier emphasis by the
 
host government on providing the necessary logistical support and counterpart
 
personnel than was the case under the KAPP contract. Finally, particularly
 
in a country as far along the development path as Korea, a loan rather than a
 
grant may have been more appropriate. A stronger commitment by MAF would
 
likely have been evidenced if it were obligated to share a higher portion
 
of the cost.
 
The type of technical assistance provided to Korea under KAPP is needed
 
in a variety of countries in the devloping world. KAPP can be viewed as a
 
prototyoe of the concepts and approach for such a set of activities. While
 
KAPP accomplished the objectives of the agreement, it should be studied care­
fully for its operational shortcomings and for the reasons that its perfor­
mance fell short of its great potential.
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